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International regimes as knowledge syndicates?  
Energy and trends of global governance 
 
Abstract 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Traditional state power and sovereignty are steadily being eroded, especially in terms of the 
provision of certain fundamental ‗public goods‘. States, in particular, are incapable of managing 
the knowledge and information which is essential to maintain competitiveness and sustainability 
in an interdependent economy. Reliable structures of global governance and international coop-
eration, however, are far from being established. Energy—a top-of-the-agenda issue for most 
governments, private entrepreneurs and civil societies—is a manifest example of these dynam-
ics. The current system of energy global governance entails policy actions scattered over di-
verse actors. The International Energy Agency has a prominent role, but it is weakened by its 
limited membership, and knowledge-driven (‗epistemic‘) rather than material or executive pow-
ers. This paper argues that neither membership size nor available means are hampering global 
energy governance. Rather, energy is one of a number of public goods which lie in limbo—
where states cannot afford their provision, and diverse interests prevent the establishment of an 
international authority. After introducing international regime theory and the concept of knowl-
edge-based epistemic communities, the paper reviews the current state of global energy gov-
ernance. It then provides a comparison of this structure with national and regional governance 
regimes on the one hand, and with environmental and health global regimes on the other. 
 
 
 
The University Institute of European Studies (IUEE) is a public institution created in 1985 by the 
Autonomous Government of Catalonia (Generalitat) and the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 
(UAB). The IUEE is an interdisciplinary centre dedicated to higher education, training and 
research on European affairs. 
 
Our faculty includes experts from different Departments of the UAB (Law, Economics, History, 
Sociology, Political Science and International Relations) and from other universities in Catalonia. 
The IUEE also hosts prestigious visiting professors and young researchers from all over the 
world. 
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Introduction 
Energy has recently made it back to the forefront of the global policy and security agenda. The sig-
nificance of energy—―the source of wealth and competition, the basis of political controversy and 
technological innovation‖ (Pascual and Elkind, 2010:1)—as a fundamental public good is clear to 
the politician as well as to the professional, to the scientist as well as to any laypeople who buy 
Saudi fuel from a national company, cook with Russian gas, plug a Chinese plug into an EU-
approved socket, own a Japanese car and install German solar panels on their roof. These issues 
do not concern energy alone. The emergence of decentralised global systems of governance has 
become a worldwide trend in the last decades, and now covers a whole array of perceived global 
public or ‗common‘ goods, bypassing the state as a ―provider of last resort‖ (Attinà, 1997). The aim 
of this paper is, in fact, to offer an overview of emerging global governance in terms of scope (to 
what extent?) and means (how?), with energy as a significant case-study.  
 
The erosion of state sovereignty and the emergence of autonomous capabilities for international 
institutions and organisations have been topic of growing scholarly interest in international relations 
(IR) theory and world politics studies for a long time, to date. The first part of this study will therefore 
give account of salient theoretical approaches, with a focus on regime theory and knowledge—the 
blend of which led to the debated concept of ‗epistemic communities‘ (Ruggie, 1975; Haas, 1992; 
Adler and Haas, 1992). The second section will get into more detail as far as the definition of an 
energy international regime is concerned, focusing on the International Energy Agency (IEA) and its 
role in a Western-led energy epistemic community. Finally, the performance of the Agency will be 
assessed vis-à-vis the presence of regional and national counterparts, and also in comparison with 
other established international regimes. 
 
The main research question of the paper asks whether global governance in energy—distributed 
across a number of diverse and relatively small actors, endowed with knowledge-based missions 
and feeble executive powers—is currently viable. This study ultimately suggests that energy, being 
a sensitive policy field which affects states‘ sovereignty directly, leaves narrow opportunities to 
global governance regardless of the size and powers of the actors involved. 
I. When cooperation prevails: a need for international regimes? 
In the post-1945 organisation of the system of international relations, nation-states have pooled 
increasing quotas of ‗sovereign‘ decision-making power to the international level. Earlier explana-
tions of international cooperation in IR theory assumed that states rationally opted for cooperation in 
accordance with plain economic reasoning: whenever its costs outweigh benefits, the provision of 
certain goods should be delegated to interstate cooperation. Economic calculation and state behav-
iour were first linked together by neo-liberal institutionalist theorists. The competing paradigm of IR 
theory, realism, was in fact not just simplistic in its utter reliance on power balance and military 
strength, but also blind to the growing mesh of transnational relations that had been rapidly deplet-
ing the meaning and essence of national sovereignty altogether. By introducing a need for coopera-
tion neo-liberal institutionalists added new theoretical depth to the debate insofar as the ―total self-
sufficiency‖ of the state was proved, at last, chimerical (Keohane, 1989:183) and power-based 
‗A>B‘ models insufficient. 
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The ―complex interdependence‖ (Keohane and Nye, 1977:23) of ‗new‘ global economic relations 
made states unable to ultimately manage the provision of several public goods. To a certain extent, 
states were forced to resort to international organisations and institutions. While some authors fo-
cused on the means of such cooperation—the kind of institutions involved, and their organisational 
features—others paid attention to its scope, i.e. what goods were to be publicly provided at the in-
ternational level, and how1. 
 
In the first group, international regime theorists attempted to overcome the simplistic equation that 
international cooperation had to be formalised in the shape of international organisations, and 
deepened the analytical framework by assuming that ―a normative element, state practice and or-
ganizational roles‖ form distinct international regimes (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986:759). Concep-
tually, international regimes do not properly overlap either international organisations or interna-
tional institutions. Regimes include ―networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize be-
havior and control its effects‖ (Keohane and Nye, 1977:19), which is ―practices‖ of ―collective 
choice‖ (Krasner, 1982:186). Hedley Bull (1995) also defined regimes vis-à-vis ‗plain‘ international 
institutions whereby the latter implement norms which are accepted beforehand within the former2. 
 
As far as the scope of international cooperation is concerned, however, at least two insightful ap-
proaches need to be taken into consideration. One, the ‗commons‘ or ‗public goods‘ theory, identi-
fies what the object of cooperation really is; the other, the epistemic community approach, gives one 
viable description of how this cooperation does eventually take place. ‗Public goods‘ theory is cru-
cial. It has been studied and developed within disparate fields, ranging from economics to human 
ecology, biology and of course IR theory (Hardin, 1968; 1998; Ostrom, 1990). It rests on the as-
sumption that certain types of goods—essential for the functioning and welfare of society—escape 
the rules of market economy. Such goods cannot be provided according to market rules because 
no producer has incentives for doing so: all consumers have a natural right to consume them, and 
hence no one can be charged for their cost (Florini and Sovacool, 2009). All consumers have a right 
to free-ride these products and benefits for producers tend to zero3. Products in such category in-
clude clean air, health, physical security. Futhermore, common goods entail externalities, that is 
―incidental byproduct‖ of economic activities, like the oft-cited example of air and water pollution 
(Florini and Sovacool, 2009:5240). This implies that public good provision is both positive and nega-
tive. The former produces vital goods; the latter confronts their negative externalities. 
 
                                            
1 For a comprehensive assessment, cf. Held and McGrew (2002, 2007) for globalisation and global governance theory, 
Archibugi et al. (1998) for a pioneering perspective on the globalisation of the political community, and the key contribu-
tion from Kaul et al. (2003) specifically on the globalisation of public goods provision. 
2 Arthur Stein (1982) developed an interesting study of the difference between international regimes, institutions and 
organisations, by means of comparison with (salient) cooperation and (mere) coordination. Semantic nuances may even 
include the concept of ‗collaboration‘, which entails different degrees of commitment by participating states. Stein‘s is 
one of the contributions to an issue of International Organization (IO), which in 1982 gave a broad and brilliant overview 
of state-of-the-art research on international regimes. The IO issue was later collected in one of the most celebrated 
books on the topic, edited by Stephen Krasner (1983). 
3 In his seminal article on the topic, ecologist Garrett Hardin (1968) explains how the commons, or public goods, posit a 
challenge of inescapability in policy making: such goods need to be produced, yet no one may rationally want to produce 
them. Hardin describes the commons as a lose-lose situation, a ―no technical solution problem‖ (Hardin, 1968:1243) that 
forces decision makers to overturn the rules of the game—by, for instance, forgoing market rules and providing these 
goods publicly. Lose-lose situations, in Hardin‘s (1968:1244) proverbial definition, are a ―remorseless... tragedy‖ of mod-
ern societies. 
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Whether a good is recognised as a common or not is ultimately a political resolution. Defining a 
product as ‗public‘ entails a responsibility of governing institutions to set up adequate means of pro-
vision. Today, the resources needed to produce such goods more and more frequently breach do-
mestic boundaries and become transnational issues, and national governments are keener on dis-
missing their responsibilities. ‗Public goods‘ theory must, therefore, lead to a theory of global gov-
ernance of public goods. 
 
Knowledge and shared expertise can offer an alternative to traditional agreements and treaty-based 
cooperation. Knowledge-based and technological complexity have become increasingly crucial to 
economic and social relations around the world. Consequently, scientists and practitioners have 
been invested with a political ―responsibility‖ for the consequences of their actions in terms of policy 
outcomes (Kuhn, 1970:176). Building on this assumption, epistemic communities theory claims that 
closed circles of experts develop inner awareness, instruments, language, objectives, world views 
and ethics, whose persuasiveness and effectiveness can ultimately translate them into policy ac-
tions (Haas, 1992). States can neither manage nor interpret enough information to deal with the 
technical complexity of global economic and social issues, and political agreements at the interna-
tional level can rarely provide a solution. Epistemic communities, however, are not just a thought 
experiment: they exist, either in the form of scientific conferences, professional associations, or 
even established institutions4. Peter Haas‘ seminal work also devised a ‗test‘ model5 (1992:3) to 
assess the presence and effectiveness of epistemic communities in a given policy context. Epis-
temic communities are in fact issue-centred: they are purposely created to address specific and 
technical problems. 
 
Although theoretically insightful, epistemic communities theory is here merely instrumental. It helps 
further define the assumptions of this paper, namely that energy is a public good, whose provision 
and security cannot be any longer guaranteed by traditional domestic policy actions alone; that the 
provision of energy as a public good has been partially delegated to a global system of governance, 
which sees the International Energy Agency (IEA) at its core, besieged by a plethora of both power-
ful and free-riding outsiders; that knowledge plays a significant role in this governance system, and 
several energy-related issues can be addressed by knowledge-sharing energy epistemic communi-
ties. 
II. Providing energy as a public good: a global arrangement 
Energy is a public good—it is essential to human activities and survival, it requires massive invest-
ment and resource deployment, and cannot be obtained individually—but one of a peculiar kind. 
Energy, in fact, features a regulated market with ruthless supply-demand games. It requires a 
                                            
4 It has been argued (Zito, 2001) that the EU‘s technocratic system, especially in the form of the European Commis-
sion‘s bureaucratic organisation, can be regarded as an epistemic community, albeit sui generis. The Commission‘s 
Directorate-Generals are not politically selected or elected, are not held accountable to voters, and tightly issue-centred. 
These continuously integrate policy action with research, information diffusion and coordination with external actors. 
5 Haas (1992:3) defines ―epistemic‖ every scientific or professional community with a ―shared set of normative and prin-
cipled beliefs..., shared causal beliefs..., shared notions of validity..., and a common policy enterprise‖. Moreover, ―pains-
taking‖ techniques are available in order to identify an epistemic community, especially vis-à-vis other group examples of 
cooperation: they ―involve identifying community membership, determining the community members‘ principled and 
causal beliefs, tracing their activities and demonstrating their influence on decision makers at various points in time, 
identifying alternative credible outcomes that were foreclosed as a result of their influence, and exploring alternative 
explanations for the action of decision makers‖ (Haas, 1992:34). 
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mechanism of global governance—first, because the state cannot control the provision of a good 
which is obtained transnationally, and whose negative externalities are indifferent to political bor-
ders; second, because energy has myriad applications and transformations, to a degree of techni-
cal complexity which is unavailable to domestic policy makers. This process of delegation to a 
‗global‘ authority is, however, entirely political. Energy is also peculiar insofar as the market and 
political activities related to energy regulation have always proceeded along different tracks and 
merged only in the face of severe crisis—the oil shocks of the 1970s and the Belorussian and 
Ukrainian gas crises in 2006 and 2009 being appropriate examples (Umbach, 2010). Overall, then, 
energy as a market is regulated by the short-term corporate interest of private actors, which con-
flicts with the medium-/long-term strategic interest of national energy politics. It is therefore crucial 
that the structural interdependence of the global economy has put an irresistible pressure upon 
governments to abide by the (volatile) interests of flexible and ‗light‘ corporate governance. Ulti-
mately the trade-off between short- and long-term strategies leans extensively in favour of market 
players—minimising the ‗public‘ quality of energy provision. 
 
To what extent would a global arrangement overcome such an ‗exploitative‘ balance of power in 
energy governance worldwide? And what are the scope and means of the energy global govern-
ance today? What constitutes and defines such regime? It is inevitably hard to single out exactly 
what the components of a global energy regime might be. In their insightful attempt, Florini and 
Sovacool (2009:5241) distinguish a ―full panoply of actors and processes‖ that equally contribute to 
such regime. The aim of this paper, however, is not to compile an index of the world‘s energy ‗tech-
nocracy‘, but rather to prove that part of energy global governance takes place through the man-
agement of knowledge and information. In this regard, the IEA definitely plays an essential role. 
The scope of the IEA: too small a global regime, too big a regional organisation 
Established in 1974, in the wake of the ‗oil shocks‘ of 1973—to which the Western consumer coun-
tries had been by and large unable to respond—and the heap of meetings and conferences which 
followed them, since the beginning the Agency has been a highly politicised entity. It was eventually 
agreed that the IEA would have been a rib of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD), a ‗cartel‘ of Western countries which had already proved sufficiently apt to 
achieve some cohesion, for instance, within the United Nations6 (UN). It is, in fact, legally stated in 
the agreement establishing the Agency7 that accession is open to OECD members only8. This re-
mains a controversial impediment to the effectiveness of the organisation. 
The IEA represents a paradox of global energy governance, insofar as its membership is both non-
universal and factional in terms of interest representation. The (almost total) coincidence with the 
OECD membership makes the IEA the token of the Western consumer community. Even histori-
                                            
6 Russett (1966), in his work on voting trends in the UN General Assembly (UNGA), speaks of a ―Western Community‖, 
which was inclusive of the ‗white‘ British Commonwealth. Moreover, Newcombe, Ross and Newcombe (1970) identify a 
looser ―Western bloc‖, in plain opposition to the Soviet one. Finally, Holloway (1990) reinterpreted the UNGA roll calls 
data, holding firm the hypothesis of an inner consistency of the OECD bloc‘s voting behaviour. 
7 Article 71.1 of the International Energy Program Agreement, signed in Paris on November 18th, 1974, states that ―[t]his 
Agreement shall be open for accession by any Member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment which is able and willing to meet the requirements of the Program‖. 
8 The IEA membership to date includes all OECD member states, with the only exception of Iceland and —most impor-
tantly—Mexico, which according to the CIA World Factbook is currently the world‘s tenth largest oil exporter. With about 
2.6 million barrels per day, Mexico exports more than the whole of the European Union. The latest oil production statis-
tics is available on-line at https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2173rank.html [accessed 
on September 9, 2010]. 
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cally, the IEA has been conceived of as the political counteroffensive to the deliberate blackmails 
and price crises sparked by the cartel of producing countries, which had earlier joined together in 
the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Energy resources, however, have an 
‗expiration date‘. It is known that, especially as far as crude oil is concerned, the ―mirage of geologi-
cal peak‖ (Harks, 2010:254) has been constantly lurking over long-term perspectives and strate-
gies, and that the current fossil-fuelled economy is resting on given and limited reserves9. This 
makes the position of the OPEC rather weak vis-à-vis their actual blackmail potential on importing 
countries. The focus now rests on more reliable reserves of natural gas10, efficient consumption, 
and ‗clean‘ or renewable energy sources. 
 
Figure 1. Comparing memberships: the IEA (left) and the OPEC (right). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Crucial stakes of the natural gas economy are in the hands of the Russian Federation. In 2007, 
Russia provided 40.8% of EU‘s total natural gas imports (DG TREN, 2010), and it is also on the 
frontline as China, the world‘s fastest growing industrial economy, plans to steadily enlarge the gas 
share in its energy consumption batch11. Relying on such de facto global monopoly, Russia‘s only 
competitors are Russian undertakings themselves. This has given rise to a disquieting blend be-
tween private and public interests12, and an overlap between Russian geopolitical objectives and its 
corporations‘ market purposes (Finon and Locatelli, 2008). Russia, moreover, promoted the crea-
tion of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum13 (GECF) in 2001. The GECF offers a permanent forum 
to diverse gas producers14, keeping price stability at the top of the agenda. It is yet too early to as-
sess whether the GECF is ready to work as a global gas governance institution—or, as it has been 
speculated, a ―Gas-OPEC‖ (Finon and Locatelli, 2008:431). Whatever the ambitions of the IEA, 
however, to establish a consensual global energy governance, keeping Russia ‗out of the club‘ is 
certainly undermining its potential. 
 
                                            
9 The debate about ‗peak oil‘ and, generally, the reliability of current geological reserves of fossil fuels has been contro-
versially discussed for the last forty years, basically since the 1970s oil shocks struck. The topic is addressed also by 
Moran and Russell (2009:3-4) and, with specific reference to oil reserves in the Gulf countries, by Chapman (2009:86-
87). 
10 An impressive 53.6% of world‘s proven natural gas reserves are held by three countries: Russia (24%, neither a IEA 
nor an OPEC member), Iran (15.6%, OPEC member) and Qatar (14%, OPEC member). 
11 The Eastern Siberian region is still largely unexplored, yet the exploitation of the Kovytka field has already aroused the 
interest of Chinese counterparts (Locatelli, 2004). Recent events in Eastern Russia emphasise the peculiarity of the 
Russian gas market. On March 23rd, 2010, the Russian-British joint venture TBK-BP announced the sale of the Kovytka 
field to Rosneftegaz, a state-controlled gas giant, ending ―a long-running dispute‖ with Gazprom—Russia‘s largest and 
most powerful gas company (Belton, 2010). 
12 Rosneftegaz‘s president, Igor Sechin, is also Russia‘s deputy prime minister. 
13 Symbolically enough, the charter of the organisation was signed in Moscow in December 2008. 
14 GECF‘s membership includes a variety of gas producing countries from all over the world, notably Norway, Qatar, 
Iran, and obviously Russia among others. The organisation manages a web portal with relevant, yet complimentary 
information, available on-line at http://www.gecforum.com.qa/ [accessed on September 9, 2010]. 
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Prospects on the side of consumption efficiency and sustainable energy development are not ros-
ier. Energy efficiency is a complex concept15 which entails new awareness on consumption, waste, 
noxious emissions, ecology, design, cultural habits and sensitivity. Again, ‗size matters‘: the effec-
tiveness of the IEA in spreading new energy consumption habits will be deeply hampered by its 
membership constraints, as long as China and India—―the fastest-growing non-OECD economies, 
and [...] key world energy consumers in the future‖ (US Energy Information Administration, 2009)—
are legally excluded from IEA and OECD memberships in the long run. On energy efficiency, the 
IEA has published more than 115 publications since its establishment; it has supervised several 
programmes on efficiency in construction, industry and on the economy of energy efficiency; it car-
ries out a yearly monitoring of the energy efficiency performance of its member states. The only way 
the IEA can try and exert some leverage on non-members, then, is to build upon this expertise. 
That was the case at the G8 Summits16 in 2008 and 2009. Weaker attempts with the G20 Summits 
resulted in a declaration17 that included IEA—along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank (WB)—in a joint effort to produce reports on current efficiency performance and 
potential in developing countries. This notwithstanding, the ability of the IEA to produce knowledge 
and perform up-to-date assessments of both consuming and producing countries is a key asset of 
the organisation. 
IEA and its means: too formal an epistemic community, too informal a bureaucracy 
Energy global governance revolves more around a number of policy cores than just one leading 
global policy entrepreneur. Consequently, the idea of energy as a public good has often changed in 
the global public perception. When an embryonic energy governance began to emerge—in the 
1970s especially—energy policies were essentially concerned with security of energy supply 
against blackmailing by producing countries and shocks following sudden supply disruption. Today, 
―the world has changed since the ‗Global Struggle‘ for oil‖ (Goldthau and Witte, 2010a:1), and en-
ergy is a multifaceted concept which includes demanding challenges such as environmental protec-
tion, development and market regulation. The evolution of the IEA has followed this route. 
 
As IEA data confirms (Scott, 1994b:379), import dependency in OECD countries had already 
peaked in 1973, before the establishment of the Agency. The IEA, therefore, had to act in a largely 
compromised situation, in terms of oil security, with limited powers and tools. Actions included the 
creation of two safeguard mechanisms against supply disruption—the Emergency Sharing System 
(ESS, in 1974) and the Coordinated Emergency Response Measures (CERM, in 1979). It was soon 
clear that supply security policy actions were both insufficient and too ‗state-sensitive‘ to enhance 
real cooperation. Richard Scott‘s reconstruction of the Agency‘s history identifies (1994b:38) three 
other ―evolutionary shifts‖: 
                                            
15 According to the IEA‘s definition, ―[a] sustainable system is characterised by its ability to deliver required services 
without exhausting resources‖, and energy efficiency entails ―wise use of resources... increased use of renewable re-
sources and controlled use of non-renewables in advanced technology‖ (IEA, 1998:19). 
16 A useful section on the works the IEA prepared for both the G8 and G20 summits is available on-line at the IEA web 
portal, http://www.iea.org/G8/index.asp [accessed on September 9, 2010]. In particular, the IEA delivered twenty-five 
recommendations to the G8 leaders, in the framework of the G8‘s Gleneagles Plan of Action on renewable sources, 
cleaner sustainable energy. The documents are accessible on-line at 
http://www.iea.org/publications/free_new_Desc.asp?PUBS_ID=2047 [accessed on September 9, 2010]. 
17 Communiqué of the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the G20, issued in St. Andrews, United King-
dom, on November 7th, 2009. The document is available on-line at http://www.iea.org/publicati 
ons/free_new_Desc.asp?PUBS_ID=2047 [accessed on September 9, 2010]. 
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• Research and development. Building on the legacy of the Committee on Energy Research 
and Development (CRD) in the 1970s, the Committee on Energy Research and Technol-
ogy (CERT) is now the leading scientific effort of the Agency. The CERT is responsible for 
intensive research and monitoring activities within the IEA framework, it supports and coor-
dinates several working groups with members‘ representatives, and it has produced forty-
two Implementation Agreements (IAs) with the member states on the most diverse energy-
related topics; 
• Environment and sustainability. Being neither an environmental agency nor a ‗lobby‘, the 
IEA developed its own approach to environmental sustainability. The main argument is that 
traditional energy security has been achieved for a long time through means—such as fos-
sil and nuclear fuels—whose externalities are overwhelmingly negative for the populace in 
terms of health and physical security, a concern common to several other international re-
gimes. Urged by the material constraint of resource depletion, the IEA has relied on the 
Working Party on Renewable Energy Technology (REWP), an advisory body to the CERT. 
The main objectives of its strategic plan include oversight and control actions, definition of 
policy proposals and recommendations, and coordinated implementation with member 
states, but most importantly ―strengthen[ing] its role as a primary source of analysis and in-
formation on renewable energy technologies for IEA committees and offices, and non-IEA 
stakeholders‖ (IEA, 2004:13); 
• IEA relations with non-members. The mandate of the Agency only reflects the needs of 
consumer countries, but the global interdependence of energy markets flows in the oppo-
site direction. If a ‗lobbyist‘ attitude against producing countries was the norm since the es-
tablishment of the Agency, the 40-year long expertise of the IEA in surveying natural re-
sources and national performance has certainly had an impact on IEA‘s relationship with 
the developing world. The Standing Group on Global Energy Dialogue (SGD) keeps the 
floor open for discussion with relevant non-OECD counterparts, but most significantly the 
IEA has become a leading model for monitoring, surveying and benchmarking—to such an 
extent that the SGD has carried out policy reviews of non-members‘ domestic energy mar-
ket construction or renovation. 
 
IEA‘s epistemic ‗regime‘ is founded upon the definition of crucial global objectives, on the spread of 
awareness, best practices and policy options, dialogue with formal and informal partners, inside and 
outside the IEA framework. This entails a clear view of what the shortcomings (e.g., membership 
and policy-making capability) and the strengths (e.g., multi-level advisory resources) of the system 
are; a clear vision of what the short- and long-term objectives—Haas‘ (1992:3) ―common policy en-
terprise‖— need to be; a strategical idea of which other actors, either at the domestic or interna-
tional level, may be introduced in the IEA‘s ‗episteme‘ and how. The IEA seems to pass Haas‘ epis-
temic ‗test‘. 
 
This process was clear already to Robert Keohane when he described IEA‘s ability to ―provid[e] 
rules that are used as guidelines by governments... or more informally, through coordination on the 
basis of principles, but without such explicit rules‖ (Keohane, 1984:221). In short, the IEA produces 
―authoritative claims to policy-relevant knowledge‖ (Haas, 1992:3) by means of a fractal distribution 
of competences, engagement, and responsibilities at different national and international levels (see 
figure 2). A similar pattern is presented by the IEA itself, in the CERT‘s Strategic Action Plan 2007-
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2011 (IEA, 2007:8), but it fails to emphasise the limited influence the state exerts on the outcomes 
of the process. 
 
The policy opportunity the state is eventually presented with is the result of a multi-level, knowl-
edge-driven process of information sharing and sectoral/local expertise. An international arrange-
ment such as the IEA might, in principle, try to exploit its ability to engage other non-state, informal 
actors in the process, and thereby impose its policy objectives or agenda—through a more execu-
tive content of the IAs, for instance. Yet, this choice is highly political. One of the arguments held 
here is that the IEA cannot afford such choice because of its limited membership and, hence its 
limited technocratic weight: ―We do not expect it to be an enforcer of rules‖ (Keohane, 1984:221). 
 
 
Figure 2. A ‗fractal‘ distribution of competence and coordination from the IEA to final decision-
making processes in member states. 
 
 
 
 
                        
III. An appraisal of the Agency in a splintered global governance 
The aim of this paper is to assess whether an intergovernmental organisation such as the IEA—
endowed with a legally limited membership and mostly with knowledge-driven policy tools—is actu-
ally capable to manage effective global energy governance. Three different hypotheses are drawn: 
h1. An issue of scope. The peculiar membership of the IEA hampers the Agency‘s 
credibility and the development of real policy competences and capabilities;  
h2. An issue of means. Management of knowledge is able to create shared beliefs, 
common objectives and roadmaps for their achievement, but is not enough to 
achieve real governance capacity; 
h3. An issue of energy. Neither limited membership nor knowledge-driven policy in-
struments limit the effectiveness of an international regime, therefore the problem 
lies on energy, which is still too sensitive a policy field to be managed at the global. 
 
From these hypotheses, a single thesis is drawn: namely that energy is one of a class of sensitive 
policy fields which—affecting directly sovereign choices of the state—do not yield (yet) an efficient 
global governance, regardless of the size of or the instruments available to the institutional ar-
rangement set up for that purpose. 
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Questioning stereotypes: do size and power really matter? 
The following comparison between energy actors, with different membership range and with diverse 
competences, can show that neither larger/smaller size, nor more/less material tools affect global 
outcomes appreciably. Such a conclusion would challenge the weary materialist assumption that 
international organisations can only be effective if they include the most ‗powerful‘ states, and have 
enforceable decision-making power (Gilpin, 1975; Krasner, 1976; Keohane and Nye, 1977; for a 
critical appraisal also see Lipson, 1984; Krasner, 1991; Snidal, 1991). 
 
The World Energy Council (WEC), the European Commission‘s Directorate General on Energy (DG 
Energy) and the United States‘ Energy Information Administration (EIA) provide a comprehensive 
array of knowledge-driven bodies and agencies (see table 1 and figure 3). 
 
Table 1. Energy international regime: various actors listed by the comprehensiveness of their 
membership and the duties of their mandate. 
 Scope of membership Means of action 
International Energy Agency Sectoral Epistemic 
World Energy Council Universal Consultive 
DG Energy Regional Epistemic 
Energy Information Administration National Consultive 
 
 
The WEC, established as early as 1923, is a global forum on energy-related issues. Extremely in-
formal in its mission and commitments, the WEC includes all OECD (and IEA) countries, most 
OPEC countries and—most significantly—powerful outsiders, such as China, India and Russia. The 
ambition of the WEC is to embody a worldwide forum for informal dialogue, although its member-
ship now includes only ninety-three members: far larger than the IEA, yet not properly global18. The 
WEC collects extensive reports and performance assessments of the energy policies of the mem-
ber states, and fosters awareness on development- and poverty-related issues. This makes the 
WEC an interesting element of comparison with the IEA. First, the WEC is granted here a consul-
tive, rather than epistemic purpose. Although the WEC has a broad competence ranging across all 
main energy resources and issues, what is missing is the epistemic commitment, that is a clear 
perception of what the institutional strategies and objectives should be, a vision of how the energy 
governance should change and why, and most importantly what the WEC‘s contribution might be. 
The WEC structure, in fact, is weak (a charity established under British law), and no explicit objec-
tive or mission is stated out. 
 
The European Commission‘s DG Energy is, by definition, a regional body. Its ‗membership‘ (EU‘s 
twenty-seven members) roughly coincides with IEA‘s, yet its mandate is clearly as much inward-
looking as IEA‘s is not geographically based. DG Energy‘s action is epistemic, but in a particular 
way. Entrenched in the institutional framework of the EU, DGs only exert those powers they have 
                                            
18 Important energy exporters, such as Venezuela and Kazakhstan, are not members of the forum, which has been this 
far unable to assert its attractiveness as a pattern of energy global governance. 
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been explicitly granted by the EU‘s Treaties19. DG Energy, in particular, was able nonetheless to 
build an extensive range of policies under its control. DG Energy has produced an impressive 
amount of policy proposals in all adjacent policy fields, where the Commission was actually given 
explicit competence: by addressing competition, environmental, developmental, common market, 
health and consumer protection issues—in full respect of the provisions of the Treaties—DG Energy 
has weaved an intricate mesh of energy legislation. DG Energy has been able, furthermore, to set 
up a number of programmes and projects outside the EU. The INOGATE programme for infrastruc-
tural development and financial assistance in Central Asian producing or transit countries, and the 
Energy Community for South-East Europe (EnC) in the Balkans (Renner, 2009), have spread the 
epistemic understandings of the Commission out across several neighbouring and partner coun-
tries. In fact, DG Energy has preserved its policy package—EU‘s energy acquis—from the influence 
and interests of EU‘s member states in the first place.  
 
 
Figure 3. Scope-means matrix for various agents of global energy governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The EIA, finally, is the statistical and analytical agency of the United States‘ Energy Department. It 
was established in 1977, with a clear statement of both fiscal and political independence. Its budget, 
therefore, is subjected to external review, and no policy recommendation should be officially made 
by means of the EIA‘s reporting activities. Its competences, in fact, lie extensively in information 
collection, statistical assessment, and monitoring/reporting on the energy performance of the coun-
try. The EIA is a liminal case in this comparison: its membership is per se the least global, and its 
activities the most subsidiary.  
 
This concise assessment has shown that actors of roughly the same membership size of the IEA 
(like EU‘s DG Energy) can actually exert significant sway on energy policy actions. Not just within a 
restricted community, but with an impact on outsiders and a tendency to homogeneity and approxi-
                                            
19 Both under the Maastricht Treaty‘s regime—which in 1992 established the EU—and in the framework of the ‗new‘ 
Lisbon Treaty, EU institutions are not given significant competences on energy policy and security. The Lisbon Treaty 
has modified the existing Treaty establishing the European Communities (TEC) with the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, which flanks a renewed version of the Treaty establishing the European Union (TEU). Article 194 of 
the TFEU now clearly states energy among EU‘s competences (although anything concerning individual member states‘ 
energy security is excluded from the provision), and defines an ordinary procedure of qualified majority vote, yet with 
significant exceptions. 
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Andrea Ciambra                                                                                   EUGOV Working Paper 29 
13 
mation. Moreover, the model suggests that even global or universal mandates do not necessarily 
coincide with a global polity: besides the relation between larger size and more difficult coordination, 
global membership does not entail globally acknowledged legitimacy. Finally, there even seems not 
to be a tight relationship between the distance from the core of political authority and the possibility 
that such bodies be invested with significant operative power20. If a small-sized, knowledge-driven 
technocratic body such as DG Energy is relatively more influential than both larger and smaller ar-
rangements, and both more informal and more executive bodies, hypotheses h1 and h2 seem dis-
confirmed by empirical evidence. 
A measure of political sensitivity? Prospects for real global governance 
The verification of hypothesis h3 is methodologically hindered by the absence of an index measur-
ing ‗how strategical‘ a policy field is for a national government. It is deductively possible, however, to 
strike a balance between the energy governance system and other relevant international regimes. 
The case of global health governance has raised vivid interest in scholarly research (Fidler, 2007; 
Lee, 2003; 2004). Health governance is an apparent paradox. It is strengthen by the prominence of 
the World Health Organisation‘s (WHO) experience, within the framework of the UN, but it is also 
weakened by myriad programmes and activities run by the ever-present duo of financial institutions, 
WB and IMF, individual states and locally-based or transnational non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). The WHO is a powerful UN agency. It is the core of international health and hygiene re-
search—which affects directly health markets, e.g. with drugs and vaccines—and it also coordi-
nates international action in the face of global threats. Moreover, it has tight connections with mem-
ber states at both regional and governmental level, and coordinates constantly with other UN agen-
cies. A profusion of smaller units at various levels contributes to the implementation of this over-
arching framework: this is what Fidler defines as the ―unstructured plurality‖ of health governance, 
with the WHO acting as an ―architecture amidst anarchy‖ (Fidler, 2007:3).  
 
The environmental governance, conversely, adds another puzzle (Biermann et al., 2009). No simi-
larly powerful universal institution exists—the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) is strongly 
development-focused and collects studies to assist policy making in the UNGA—and knowledge 
management and epistemic communities seem to play a salient role again: EU‘s DG Environment 
has contributed to the acquis communautaire with a wealth of provisions (ranging from pollution and 
emissions quota to end-user behaviour), in tight relation with the more executive European Envi-
ronmental Agency (EEA). The United States‘ Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), finally, is a 
quintessential example of an independent national agency with operative duties and tight connec-
tion to governmental policies in a narrow policy sector. Re-drawing the scope-means model used 
above for energy governance would give a snapshot of just a small portion of the global governance 
system, while shedding some light on how such sensitive public goods are provided globally (see 
figure 4). 
 
 
                                            
20 A regional institution, with limited mandate, such as DG Energy seems overall more incisive and powerful than an 
agency—like the EIA—directly connected to a branch of a national executive. This conclusion, however, needs re-
elaboration: how methodologically sound is to include a domestic agent in the appraisal of energy global governance? 
However powerful the state an agency is connected to, to what extent can it shape global governance—in terms of 
standards, monitoring, best practices, information? An index should be devised that defines relative power of each gov-
ernance agent vis-à-vis the context it is entrenched in. 
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Figure 4. Broader scope-means matrix for energy, health (italics) and environmental (bold ital-
ics) protection global governance actors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If most units placed themselves in the lower-right quadrant, one could assume that a relation be-
tween distance from a political core and policy capability exists: the state level would remain the 
most effective for policy actions. Conversely, if most units crowded the upper-right quadrant, one 
could argue that global governance is an effective means of public good provision tout court, a reli-
able alternative to state-driven policies. Neither option occurs, and pattern is even more confused. 
When states commit themselves to strong universal frameworks (that is the case of the UN-framed 
WHO), global governance has room for manoeuvre. When states are reluctant, because of a mix of 
private market interest and electorally sensitive sovereignty shares, they retain power at the domes-
tic level. The regional alternative seems a powerful exception. Both at the OECD and at the EU 
level, limited membership, swifter decision-making procedures and a closer connection with public-
good demand seem to yield better performances. It should be stated clearly, however, that the 
unique institutional framework of the EU, in particular, fosters the emergence of epistemic under-
standings and shared ‗policy missions‘, making regional policies an essential (and powerful) com-
plement of states‘ domestic action (Zito, 2001). 
Conclusion 
Despite the claims that state sovereignty is being irreversibly eroded in favour of coordinated inter-
national action at the global level, global governance is far from being fully structured and accom-
plished. The case of energy, a top-of-the-agenda issue for most national governments and interna-
tional institutions, shows that coordination can wind up to a stalemate according to the comprehen-
siveness and the powers of such international structures. 
 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) is a salient case-study. Legally connected to the Western-
based membership of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), it 
was established in 1970s to overtly face the strategies of the energy exporting countries (especially 
oil producers of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC), and today excludes 
significant producers (Russia) and growing consumers (China, India, Brazil) from its membership. 
Moreover, the Agency has not been granted enforceable powers, but it has learnt to exert influence 
on member states‘ policy making by means of a common view of energy global issues, scientific 
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and professional research, a clear strategy for the achievement of common objectives and desired 
outcomes—becoming, that is, an epistemic community and operating as a ―global energy policy 
advisor‖ (Van der Graaf and Lesage, 2009:314).  
 
In order to assess the hypotheses that limited membership of the actors and limited enforceable 
powers were preventing energy from achieving reliable and effective global governance, IEA‘s per-
formance was compared to that of other relevant players. Both ‗universal‘ arrangements such as 
the World Energy Council and national bodies such as the US‘ Energy Information Administration 
present weaker influence and executive capabilities than the IEA. Conversely, the European Com-
mission‘s Directorate General on Energy—featuring roughly the same limited, community-based 
membership—has shown a capacity to play an essential role in the construction of EU‘s internal 
market and, also, to go beyond EU‘s boundaries spreading a ‗European‘ energy episteme out to 
neighbouring areas. Limited membership and epistemic means of action, therefore, do not seem to 
hinder globally concerted action. This study suggests that the problem lies in energy itself. If energy 
is compared to other international regimes, such as healthcare and environmental protection, some 
public goods appear more ‗cooperation-prone‘: where values widely recognised by the international 
community are at stake (e.g., health), coordination at higher levels (e.g., the United Nations) and 
with more formal powers (e.g., the World Health Organisation) is possible; in other fields, regardless 
of their widespread sensitivity (e.g., environment), where more private and market interests are at 
stake (e.g., energy), global coordination per se fails, and more focused actors (e.g., the EU) can 
emerge, especially if relying on internal resources.  
 
The tests run in this paper, finally, suggest a few methodological caveats. The comparability of re-
gimes wherein a plethora of actors behave according to changing interests is certainly debatable, 
and the empirical assessment was reduced to arbitrarily selected ‗salient‘ cases21. Nevertheless, 
energy governance offers an array of interesting cases for comparative analysis, holding firm either 
membership scope or executive powers. Suggestions for further research and policy analysis in-
clude the role of overarching international arrangements, like the United Nations—an institutional 
framework within which other attempts at global governance (e.g., the WHO) have gained further 
momentum and credibility. Such highly regarded organisations should formally identify what public 
goods can effectively be provided at a trans- or supranational level. The amount and quality of 
knowledge which can be collected by means of cooperation is unattainable by nation-states: global 
governance has the potential to solve not only economic and market dilemmas, but to significantly 
improve human lives as well. 
 
                                            
21 The case of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), a 52-signatory multilateral organisation which involves a number of 
politically significant producers—the Russian Federation (albeit provisionally and only as far as certain parts of the 
Treaty are concerned), Norway, and Kazakhstan among others—and transit countries (e.g., Ukraine and Turkey), would 
be particularly fitting for further research. The ECT and the Energy Charter Conference (ECC) were originally conceived 
as early as in 1991 with a specific outlook on European consumers‘ energy security and on the involvement of the 
emerging Eastern energy markets after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The vantage point of the organisation has pro-
gressively expanded to include non-European significant producers such as the United States and Middle Eastern 
OPEC-members as observers to the ECC (on the ECT cf. Wälde, 1996; Omalu, 1999; Konoplyanik and Wälde, 2006; 
Haghighi, 2007:187ff). 
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